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Rhymes v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 (March 24, 2005)1 
 
EVIDENCE - PRIOR BAD ACTS 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, on charges of 
lewdness with a minor under the age of fourteen. 
 
Disposition 
 
 Affirmed.  The Court concluded that the district court properly admitted evidence 
of the defendant's prior bad acts, but that the district court erred by failing to give a 
limiting instruction related to the uncharged bad acts evidence at the time the evidence 
was introduced.  The Court held that when evidence of prior bad acts relates to bad acts 
that are uncharged in the case at bar, instructions must be given both at the time the 
evidence is admitted and again during jury instructions.  Even though the district court 
failed to give a limiting instruction at the time the uncharged bad acts evidence was 
introduced, the Court concluded that the failure to give such an instruction constituted 
harmless error. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 On December 7, 2001, Defendant/Appellant Michael Rhymes was living with 
Irene Vela, her daughter, and her three sons.  Vela's daughter invited a twelve-year-old 
friend (the victim) to spend the night at Vela's house.  The victim awoke when she felt 
her pajama bottoms being pulled down and saw Rhymes lying next to her.  Rhymes told 
her that he had taken massage classes as he massaged her leg.  She told Rhymes to stop, 
then woke Vela's daughter and attempted to return to the victim's apartment.  She told 
Vela's daughter about what had happened. 
 After returning home, the victim told her mother what happened.  The mother 
called the police, who interviewed Vela's daughter and the victim.  The girls corroborated 
each other's stories.  The victim underwent a sexual assault exam, the results of which 
were negative.  Police also interviewed Rhymes, who denied touching the victim.  
Rhymes was subsequently charged with one count of lewdness with a child under the age 
of fourteen.   
Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of other bad acts for which 
Rhymes was not presently being charged, asserting that the acts were admissible to show 
intent and the absence of mistake.  To show his prior bad acts, the State called two 
witnesses who had filed sexual misconduct complaints against Rhymes in the past.  Both 
women alleged that Rhymes, while giving them massages, committed acts of sexual 
misconduct against them.  In a separate case, the State charged Rhymes with sexual 
misconduct as a result of these allegations. 
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The district court admitted the evidence based on the State's argument that it was 
relevant to establish intent and that there was a similarity between the prior bad acts and 
the acts alleged by the victim in the present case.  It also determined that the probative 
value of the prior bad acts evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice to Rhymes.  The court failed, however, to determine whether the State 
proved the prior case by clear and convincing evidence.  The court also neglected to give 
the required limiting instruction when the prior bad acts evidence was introduced, but did 
give such an instruction when the jury was charged. 
Rhymes was convicted of lewdness with a minor under the age of fourteen and 
was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after a minimum of ten 
years.  On appeal, Rhymes contended that the district court erred by:  (1) failing to 
conduct a hearing, pursuant to the requirements of Petrocelli v. State,2 to determine the 
admissibility of the prior bad acts evidence; and (2) failing to give a limiting instruction 
at the time the evidence was admitted at trial. 
 
Discussion 
 
 1.  Failure to hold a Petrocelli hearing. 
 
 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may not be introduced as proof of a 
person's character, but may be introduced to prove, inter alia, intent and absence of 
mistake or accident.3  Prior bad acts evidence, however, is looked upon with disfavor 
because such evidence is often irrelevant and prejudicial.  Consequently, it is presumed to 
be inadmissible and the State bears the burden of requesting that the evidence be admitted 
and establishing its admissibility.4  To do this, the State must demonstrate at a hearing 
outside the jury’s presence that: (1) the prior incident is relevant to the present crime; (2) 
the prior act is proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the probative value of 
the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.5 
 The trial court has the discretion to admit or exclude prior bad acts evidence, and 
its ruling will stand absent a showing that its decision was manifestly incorrect.6  If the 
court fails to conduct the requisite pre-admission hearing, such failure is reversible error 
unless:  (1) the record is sufficient for the Nevada Supreme Court to determine that the 
evidence is admissible pursuant to the Tinch standard; or (2) the result would have been 
the same if the lower court did not admit the evidence.7    
In Rhymes, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the trial court conducted the 
necessary Petrocelli hearing and determined that the prior bad acts testimony was 
relevant as to both intent and similarity and that its probative value outweighed its 
prejudicial effect, but that the court failed to determine that the prior bad acts were 
proven by clear and convincing evidence.  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the 
record sufficiently established the occurrence of the prior bad acts by clear and 
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convincing evidence.  Moreover, the district court's determination that the bad acts 
evidence was relevant was not manifestly erroneous, so the evidence was properly 
admitted in this case. 
 
2.  The district court's failure to give a limiting instruction at the time the evidence 
was admitted. 
 
The district court failed to give the jury a limiting instruction at the time the bad 
acts evidence was introduced.  The Nevada Supreme Court held that this was a harmless 
error because the court gave the jury a limiting instruction prior to being charged.  When 
uncharged bad acts are admitted into evidence, a limiting instruction should be given both 
at the time of admission and in the trial court's final charge to the jury.8  The requirement 
of instruction upon admission is important because it allows the instruction to take effect 
prior to the jury's becoming accustomed to thinking of it in terms of the inadmissible 
purpose of the evidence.9  Nevertheless, if a court fails to give such a limiting instruction, 
that failure is harmless if the error did not have a substantial, injurious effect, or if it did 
not influence the jury's verdict.10 
In Rhymes, the State contended that Tavares was distinguishable from the present 
case because in Tavares, the defendant never faced charges for the commission of the 
prior bad acts, but the defendant in Rhymes did, in fact, face charges for the prior bad 
acts.  The Court disagreed, noting that the term "uncharged bad acts" refers to any acts 
uncharged in the instant case, and does not refer to any prior bad acts that were never 
charged in any case.  The Court stated that the fact that prior bad acts have been charged 
in another case does not relieve the State of its burden of requesting a limiting instruction 
prior to the admission of bad acts evidence, nor does it relieve the trial court of its burden 
of giving the instruction sua sponte if the State fails to request such an instruction. 
The Court held that even though the trial court failed to give a limiting instruction 
at the time of the admission of prior bad acts evidence, it gave the instruction at the time 
the jury was charged.  The jury was instructed that the evidence could only be considered 
for the purposes of proving intent and similarity.  Because the jury received the 
instruction prior to deliberation, and because there was uncertainty as to whether the prior 
bad acts were "uncharged bad acts," the district court's failure to give an instruction at the 
time of admission of the evidence did not substantially affect Rhymes' rights.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred when it failed 
to expressly determine if the State proved the occurrence of Rhymes' prior bad acts by 
clear and convincing evidence, but that the failure constituted harmless error because the 
record sufficiently demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Rhymes 
committed the prior bad acts.  Moreover, the Court found that the district court erred by 
failing to give the jury a limiting instruction at the time the prior bad acts evidence was 
introduced, but that such error was harmless because the jury received such an instruction 
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prior to being charged.  Furthermore, there was no evidence that Rhymes requested such 
an instruction at the time the evidence was admitted.  If he had, the district court would 
have been obligated to give the instruction.  Thus, the Court affirmed the conviction. 
